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Daphne Gilbert*

Faith and/in Medicine: Religious and
Conscientious Objections to MAiD

Across Canada, health care institutions that operate under the umbrella of religious
traditions refuse to offer medical assistance in dying (MAiD) on the grounds that it
violates their Charter-protected rights to freedom of religion and conscience. This
article analyses the Supreme Court jurisprudence on section 2(a) and concludes
that it should not extend to the protection of institutional rights. While the Court has
not definitively pronounced a view on this matter, its jurisprudence suggests that any
institutional right to freedom of religion would not extend to decisions on publicly-funded
and legal health care. MAiD is a constitutionally-protected option for individuals and
both courts and governments should prioritize an individual’s right to access health
care over any institutional considerations. Health care regulatory bodies already offer
individual health care practitioners the compromise of making an effective referral to a
non-objecting colleague in matters that implicate conscientious or religious objections.
Institutions may be filled with people, but they are built of bricks and mortar. The
institutions themselves should not take a moral stance on this complex social issue.
They most certainly should not take an oppositional position to the Charter-protected
rights of patients. The author concludes that provincial governments across this country
must appreciate their duty to be neutral on matters of conscience and religion and take
strong leadership roles in making clear to publicly-funded institutions that they must not
deny medical services solely on religious or conscientious grounds.
Dans tout le Canada, des établissements de soins de santé qui fonctionnent sous
l’égide de traditions religieuses refusent d’offrir l’assistance médicale à mourir au
motif que cela viole leur droit à la liberté de religion et de conscience protégé par la
Charte. Dans le présent article, nous analysons la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême
relative à l’alinéa 2a) et concluons qu’elle ne devrait pas s’étendre à la protection des
droits des établissements. Bien que la Cour ne se soit pas définitivement prononcée
sur cette question, sa jurisprudence indique que le droit à la liberté de religion d’un
établissement ne saurait s’étendre aux décisions relatives aux soins de santé légaux
et financés par l’État. L’assistance médicale à mourir est une option protégée par la
Constitution et les tribunaux comme les gouvernements devraient donner la priorité
au droit d’une personne d’y accéder. Les organismes de réglementation des soins de
santé offrent déjà aux praticiens le compromis de référer un patient à un collègue non
objecteur dans les cas d’objections de conscience ou religieuses. Les établissements
peuvent être remplis de personnes, mais ils sont construits de briques et de mortier.
Les établissements eux-mêmes ne devraient pas adopter une position morale sur cette
question sociale complexe. Ils ne devraient certainement pas s’opposer au respect des
droits des patients protégés par la Charte. L’auteur conclut que les gouvernements
provinciaux de tout le pays doivent tenir compte de leur devoir de neutralité sur les
questions de conscience et de religion et assumer un rôle de leadership fort en indiquant
clairement aux établissements financés par l’État qu’ils ne doivent pas refuser des
services médicaux uniquement pour des raisons religieuses ou de conscience.
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Introduction
In 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously constitutionalized
access to medical assistance in dying (MAiD).1 It is not an unqualified
right and the Court left it to Parliament to set out the circumstances under
which a person can lawfully receive MAiD. The next year the federal
government responded with legislation that decriminalized MAiD, set out
the specific situations when it can be accessed and, as is consistent with
the division of powers, left it to the provinces to implement regulations.2
Despite judicial leadership and legislative response, MAiD remains
fraught with difficulties both for the health care workers who must deliver
care within a permissive regime, and for a broader Canadian public who
has to adapt to a value-laden choice legally available for some of our most
vulnerable citizens. There are innumerable legal, legislative, political and
1.
See Carter v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 5 [Carter].
2.
See Bill C-14, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other Acts
(medical assistance in dying), 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2016 (assented to 17 June 2016), SC 2016, c 3 [Bill
C-14].
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social challenges surrounding MAiD, including legal challenges to the
federal legislative criteria for accessing it,3 concerns over accurate recordkeeping for requests, denials in the performance of MAiD, difficulties
facilitating access in remote locations, tensions within the palliative care
community over how MAiD fits within that mandate, and the lingering
stigma associated with the choice. All of these issues, and others, will
need time and patience to sort out as we move to making MAiD accessible
and acceptable.
This essay focuses on one of the most significant challenges:
conscientious and religious objections to the provision of MAiD.
Across Canada, publicly-funded faith-influenced4 institutions refuse to
provide MAiD. Some individual physicians profess strong religious and
conscientious objections to it.5 The individual and institutional resistance
combines to imperil access to MAiD and to stigmatize it as the “wrong”
choice. For those who fit the criteria for accessing MAiD and who want
3.
Following a decision in the Quebec Superior Court in Truchon c Procureur général du Canada,
2019 QCCS 3792 [Truchon], the Federal government introduced amendments to the Criminal Code,
RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code] that expanded access to MAiD; See Bill C-7, An Act to amend
the Criminal Code (medical assistance in dying), 1st Sess, 43rd Parl, 2020 (first reading 24 February
2020) [Bill C-7]. The most significant amendment removes the requirement that death be “reasonably
foreseeable.” Further review of excluded categories is promised beginning in June 2020.
4.
I am grateful to a participant at the 2019 Canadian Association of MAiD Assessors and Providers
conference in Vancouver, British Columbia for suggesting this descriptor. I had been using “faithbased hospitals” but “faith-influenced” more accurately captures that the hospitals I am concerned
about here are publicly-funded institutions that operate under the auspices of a religious umbrella
steering group. They are therefore not directly run by a particular Church but rather are influenced in
policy decisions by their directing faith-led organizations.
5.
This paper focuses on religious and conscientious objection in particular. Scholars note that
there are other reasons why a practitioner might not want to provide MAiD. Shaad and Shaad
argue: “Some doctors might view MAID as contrary to the internal morality of medicine. Others
are palliative care specialists concerned that MAID impedes access to palliative care services. Still
others might understandably fear that it would have a corrupting influence on their own character.”
See Philip Shaad & Joshua Shaad, “Institutional Non-participation in Assisted Dying: Changing
the Conversation” (2019) 33:1 Bioethics 207 at 213. There has been considerable resistence among
many members of the palliative care community to offering MAiD in hospices and palliative care
institutions. In November 2019, the Canadian Hospice Palliative Care Association and the Canadian
Society of Palliative Care Specialists issued a joint statement arguing that MAiD is NOT part of
the palliative care “basket” nor is it an extension of palliative care: “Hospice palliative care and
MAiD substantially differ in multiple areas including in philosophy, intention and approach. Hospice
palliative care focuses on improving quality of life and symptom management through holistic personcentered care for those living with life threatening conditions. Hospice palliative care sees dying as a
normal part of life and helps people to live and die well. Hospice palliative care does not seek to hasten
death or intentionally end life. In MAiD, however, the intention is to address suffering by ending life
through the administration of a lethal dose of drugs at an eligible person’s request.” See “CHPCA and
CSPCP—Joint Call to Action” (2019), online (pdf): Canadian Hospice Palliative Care Association &
Canadian Society of Palliative Care Physicians <https://www.cspcp.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/
CHPCA-and-CSPCP-Statement-on-HPC-and-MAiD-Final.pdf> [https://perma.cc/2LY6-6EV2]. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to consider the palliative care community position, but it should be
emphasized it goes beyond matters of conscience.
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to exercise that choice, any denial of access is a profoundly devastating
roadblock in what is already a complicated path. While there may be
a need to move with some caution, and a need to be sensitive to how
fundamental a shift this might seem in healthcare provision, the Supreme
Court has spoken clearly. Canadians who meet the legislated criteria have
a constitutional entitlement not to have unjustified barriers put in the way
of access to MAiD within a publicly-funded health care system. While
we might fiddle with the criteria, expanding it and clarifying it with more
experience,6 over 7000 Canadians have already received MAiD and it is
becoming a more realistic end-of-life option with each passing month.
Part I of this paper offers a brief overview of the Supreme Court of
Canada’s constitutionalization of access to MAiD in Carter. Part II offers
a short summary of the Court’s approach to freedom of religion as laid
out in its section 2(a) jurisprudence, examining both the individual and
institutional aspects of the freedom as they pertain to MAiD. Part III
describes the contours of conscientious or religious objection to MAiD
at the individual physician level and assesses the role it plays at the
institutional level. Part III also applies the doctrinal tests developed by the
Supreme Court of Canada for section 2(a) to individual and institutional
objections to MAiD. Part IV considers the section 1 balancing exercise
to reconcile the rights of conscientious and religious objectors with the
rights of Canadians wanting access to MAiD. The paper concludes by
recommending that all provincial regulatory bodies require at the least
an “effective referral” model for individual conscientious or religious
6.
In December 2016, the Minister of Health Jane Philpott and Minister of Justice and Attorney
General of Canada Jody Wilson-Raybould asked the Council of Canadian Academies to undertake
independent reviews related to medical assistance in dying: “Specifically, the CCA is tasked with
examining three particularly complex types of requests for medical assistance in dying that were
identified for further review and study in the legislation passed by Parliament in 2016. These cases are:
requests by mature minors, advance requests, and requests where mental illness is the sole underlying
medical condition.” See “State of Knowledge on Medical Assitance in Dying for Mature Minors,
Advance Requests, and Where a Mental Disorder is the Sole Underlying Medical Condition” (2018),
online (pdf): Council of Canadian Academies <www.cca-reports.ca?> [https://perma.cc/43KMES9Q]; “The State of Knowledge on Medical Assistance in Dying for Mature Minors” (2018), online
(pdf): Council of Canadian Academies <www.cca-reports.ca> [https://perma.cc/48GC-MRYQ]; “The
State of Knowledge on Advance Requests for Medical Assistance in Dying” (2018), online (pdf):
Council of Canadian Academies <www.cca-reports.ca> [https://perma.cc/9EFF-GG32]; “The State of
Knowledge on Medical Assistance in Dying Where a Mental Disorder is the Sole Underlying Medical
Condition” (2018), online (pdf): Council of Canadian Academies <www.cca-reports.ca> [https://
perma.cc/LWV6-7ZJS]. In June, 2020 a legislated review of MAiD will begin to consider all of
these issues. As of October, 2018, 6749 people had accessed legalized MAiD in Canada. See “Fourth
Interim Report on Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada” (April 2019), online (pdf): Health Canada
<https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/hc-sc/documents/services/publications/health-system-services/
medical-assistance-dying-interim-report-april-2019/medical-assistance-dying-interim-report-april2019-eng.pdf> [https://perma.cc/AG6A-A4TS].
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objectors. Ontario’s policy, outlined below, can serve as an example,
as it requires objectors to refer to a colleague in a good faith, timely
way, without impeding access to any services. The paper ends with the
normative assertion that objections by publicly-funded institutions should
not be permitted. While not all hospitals offer all medical services,
to the extent an institution is competent to offer MAiD, and routinely
experiences end-of-life situations with patients, it should not be allowed
to refuse MAiD on religious or conscientious grounds. Access to MAiD
should be unimpeded by politics, professional regulatory regimes, and
religion. We should support the early and ongoing efforts to make MAiD
accessible by addressing the proper limits of freedom of conscience and
religion claims in providing the service. In so doing, we can hopefully
protect the people providing and accessing MAiD, accommodate those
health care practitioners who object to providing MAiD, and establish
proper boundaries for health care institutions.
I.

Rights in conflict: the constitutionalization of MAiD

1. The Carter decision
Carter marked a dramatic moment for the Supreme Court of Canada and
the country. The Court revisited its 1993 decision, Rodriguez v British
Columbia (Attorney General), in which a closely divided 5-4 Court
concluded that criminal prohibitions on physician assisted death did
not violate a person’s section 7 right to life and security of the person.7
Some twenty years later, the Court in Carter found that both societal and
individual norms had shifted and that our understanding of what constitutes
“principles of fundamental justice” (POFJ) had evolved. Presented with a
comprehensive evidentiary record and the accumulated wisdom of other
countries that allow MAiD, the Supreme Court upheld the trial judge’s
decision that blanket criminal prohibitions on MAiD violate the section 7
rights of those with a grievous and irremediable medical condition.8
7.
[1993] 3 SCR 519, 107 DLR (4th) 342 [Rodriguez]. Sue Rodriguez was the rights claimant in
this case. She suffered from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, a rapidly deteriorating physical condition that
impacted every physical aspect of her body. She argued that the criminal law prohibitions on assisted
suicide violated her section 7 and 15 rights. A majority of the Court disagreed. Justice Sopinka concluded
that section 7 was most concerned with the value of “life” in its protection of security of the person, and
that valuing life was incompatible with permitting vulnerable people to receive aid in dying. Further, there
was no international consensus on permitting assisted death.
8.
Specifically the Court concluded in Carter, supra note 1 at para 127: “The appropriate remedy
is therefore a declaration that s 241(b) and s 14 of the Criminal Code are void insofar as they prohibit
physician-assisted death for a competent adult person who (1) clearly consents to the termination
of life; and (2) has a grievous and irremediable medical condition (including an illness, disease or
disability) that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances
of his or her condition. ‘Irremediable,’ it should be added, does not require the patient to undertake
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In particular, the Court held that the criminal law restrictions caused
some people to take their lives prematurely, while still physically capable of
doing so themselves, rather than wait until they were physically incapable
and assistance would be unlawful. This premature implementation of the
decision to die by choice as a result of the state’s laws—federal Criminal
Code prohibitions—constituted a state deprivation of life that was not in
accordance with the POFJ. The provisions violated the POFJ by being
overbroad.9 While the state may have a valid interest in protecting
vulnerable individuals who could be coerced into assisted death, the
blanket prohibition also captured autonomous individuals who were not
vulnerable, but simply physically incapable of carrying out their death. It
also captured those who had the mental and physical capacity to make the
decision, but did not want to commit suicide in secret and by potentially
gruesome means.10 Those who meet legislative criteria for access, the
Court said, should be able to freely make this choice, facilitated by the
state. The state’s deprivation of life through a blanket prohibition therefore
violated section 7 of the Charter.
The Court in Carter acknowledged that medical professionals—those
who would be tasked with performing MAiD—would have to grapple with
religious and conscientious beliefs and values around death and assisted
death. Several intervenor religious organizations asked the Court to include
strong protections for conscientious and religious objection in crafting a
remedy.11 The Court carefully noted that a declaration of invalidity of the
Criminal Code provisions does nothing to compel physician participation.
It left the question of the extent of protections for conscientious and
religious rights to physician regulatory bodies and the provinces. While
recognizing there are religious and conscientious implications for some, it
stayed decidedly out of the fray in settling how those concerns should be
addressed. The Court only observed that the Charter rights of physicians
and patients would have to be “reconciled.”12

treatments that are not acceptable to the individual.”
9.
Ibid at paras 56-58, 86-88.
10. Ibid at para 86.
11. The Court summarized the intervenor submissions: “The Catholic Civil Rights League, the
Faith and Freedom Alliance, the Protection of Conscience Project, and the Catholic Health Alliance
of Canada all expressed concern that physicians who object to medical assistance in dying on moral
grounds may be obligated, based on a duty to act in their patients’ best interests, to participate in
physician-assisted dying. They ask us to confirm that physicians and other health-care workers cannot
be compelled to provide medical aid in dying. They would have the Court direct the legislature to
provide robust protection for those who decline to support or participate in physician-assisted dying
for reasons of conscience or religion” (ibid at para 130).
12. Ibid at para 132.
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2. Bill C-14
The Federal Government responded to Carter with Bill C-14 “Medical
Assistance in Dying.”13 The law received Royal Assent in June 2016 and
set out the circumstances under which MAiD can be lawfully performed.14
The eligibility criteria departed from the Supreme Court’s approach in
some fundamental ways. The Supreme Court declared the Criminal Code
prohibitions void in so far as they applied to:
“a competent adult person who (1) clearly consents to the termination of
life and (2) has a grievous and irremediable medical condition (including
an illness, disease or disability) that causes enduring suffering that is
intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of his or her condition.
‘Irremediable,’ it should be added, does not require the patient to
undertake treatments that are not acceptable to the individual.”15

The federal legislation required death to be “reasonably foreseeable”16
and also required that the person be in an “advanced state of irreversible
decline in capability.”17 Furthermore, the person’s condition had to be both
serious and incurable.18
The government proposed the law after a period of consultation by
a Special Joint Senate-House of Commons Committee that produced a
report with twenty-one recommendations in February 2016.19 Among
13. Bill C-14, supra note 2.
14. Bill C-14 supra note 2 at s 241.2 (1) “A person may receive medical assistance in dying only if
they meet all of the following criteria:
(a) they are eligible—or, but for any applicable minimum period of residence or waiting period,
would be eligible—for health services funded by a government in Canada;
(b) they are at least 18 years of age and capable of making decisions with respect to their health;
(c) they have a grievous and irremediable medical condition;
(d) they have made a voluntary request for medical assistance in dying that, in particular, was
not made as a result of external pressure; and
(e) they give informed consent to receive medical assistance in dying after having been
informed of the means that are available to relieve their suffering, including palliative care.”
15. Carter, supra note 1 at para 127.
16. But see recent proposed amendments to the Criminal Code that would remove this criterium,
Bill C-7, supra note 3.
17. Bill C-14, supra note 2 at s 241.2 (2): “A person has a grievous and irremediable medical
condition only if they meet all of the following criteria:
(a) they have a serious and incurable illness, disease or disability;
(b) they are in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability;
(c) that illness, disease or disability or that state of decline causes them enduring physical
or psychological suffering that is intolerable to them and that cannot be relieved under
conditions that they consider acceptable; and
(d) their natural death has become reasonably foreseeable, taking into account all of their
medical circumstances, without a prognosis necessarily having been made as to the specific
length of time that they have remaining.”
18. Ibid.
19. House of Commons, Medical Assistance in Dying: A Patient-Centred Approach: Report of the
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the recommendations are two that pertain to conscientious and religious
objectors. First, recommendation 10 suggests:
“That the Government of Canada work with the provinces and territories
and their medical regulatory bodies to establish a process that respects a
health care practitioner’s freedom of conscience while at the same time
respecting the needs of a patient who seeks medical assistance in dying.
At a minimum, the objecting practitioner must provide an effective
referral for the patient.”20

The Committee quoted directly from Carter on the need to
“reconcile” patient and physician rights and concluded “having health care
professionals who conscientiously object to MAiD provide an effective
referral for a patient who seeks MAiD is an appropriate balancing of the
rights of patients and the conscience rights of physicians.”21
Second, recommendation 11 suggests: “[t]hat the Government of
Canada work with the provinces and territories to ensure that all publicly
funded health care institutions provide medical assistance in dying.”22
In laying out this recommendation the Committee noted: “[a] number
of witnesses argued, and the Committee also believes, that if a health
care facility is publicly funded, it must provide MAiD. The difficulty
in transferring a patient from one facility to another was highlighted.”23
Some Conservative members of the Joint Committee filed a dissenting
report, disagreeing with many of the recommendations including the
two on conscientious and religious objections.24 The dissenting report
concluded an effective referral regime went too far. It preferred that the
government establish an independent agency to coordinate referrals for
MAiD. Objecting physicians would be obligated to give patients the
contact information for the agency, which would then connect the patient
to a provider.25 This model is used in Alberta and Quebec, for example.26
The dissenting report also stressed that faith-influenced institutions must
be exempt from the requirement to provide MAiD.27 They relied on the
Special Joint Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying (February 2016) (Joint Chairs: Hon Kelvin
Kenneth Ogilvie & Robert Oliphant).
20. Ibid at 26.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid at 27.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid at 51 (dissenting opinion of Members of the Conservative Party of Canada on the Joint
Committee).
25. Ibid at 55.
26. See Act Respecting End-of-Life Care, CQLR c S-32.0002, ss 31, 50 [Quebec EOL Care]; Alberta
Health Services, “Medical Assistance in Dying: Policy HCS-165-01” (2018) at 8, online (pdf): <www.
albertahealthservices.ca> [https://perma.cc/SQ76-ZELD] [AHS Policy].
27. House of Commons, supra note 19 at 55.
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Supreme Court’s observation in Loyola that, “individual and collective
aspects of freedom of religion and conscience guaranteed under the
Charter are ‘indissolubly intertwined.’”28
The federal legislation crafted in part from these recommendations
includes only this statement in its preamble: “[w]hereas everyone has
freedom of conscience and religion under section 2 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms…”29 MAiD is therefore legally available
in Canada for certain individuals who meet the criteria and want to
exercise the choice. Provincial responsibility for the delivery of healthcare
has produced a patchwork of options to accommodate religious and
conscientious objectors. In Manitoba, for example, objecting physicians
are permitted to refuse to refer a patient to a non-objecting colleague, but
are required to provide patients with an informational resource.30 In Alberta
and Quebec, a “self-referral” model prevails where patients can contact a
centralized referral service if their own physician refuses.31 Ontario has
the most robust system, requiring an “effective referral.”32 Across the
country, faith-influenced institutions, loosely organized under umbrella
organizations, collectively refuse to provide MAiD. Some jurisdictions
have more faith-influenced institutions than others. In Newfoundland, for
example, there are none.33 Much of Alberta, on the other hand, is serviced
by faith-influenced institutions.34 All of this regional disparity means that
ease of access to MAiD depends on where you live. This is eerily familiar
for those who champion reproductive rights, as the Supreme Court decision
in R v Morgentaler struck down Criminal Code prohibitions on abortion
in part because of unequal access to the service across the country.35 In
28. Ibid, citing Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 121 at para 94 [Loyola].
29. Bill C-14, supra note 2.
30. “Standards of Practice of Medicine” (2019) at 99, online (pdf): College of Physicians &
Surgeons of Manitoba <http://cpsm.mb.ca/> [https://perma.cc/Q2QT-AW3Q] [CPSM Standard]; See
also, “Policy: Medical Assistance in Dying” (2017) at 3.16, 4.1, online (pdf): Winnipeg Regional
Health Authority <www.wrha.mb.ca/MAiD> [https://perma.cc/S2WY-Q7NF].
31. See Quebec EOL Care, supra note 26 at ss 31, 51; AHS Policy, supra note 26 at 8.
32. “Medical Assistance in Dying” (2018) at 5, online (pdf): College of Physicians & Surgeons of
Ontario <www.cpso.on.ca> [https://perma.cc/V58D-6S39] [CPSO Policy].
33. “Room to Grow: About Our Health Care System” (2019), online: Practice Newfoundland and
Labrador <www.practicenl.ca> [https://perma.cc/6XW5-GRKG].
34. See “Hospitals and Health Centres” (2019), online: Convenant Health <www.covenanthealth.
ca> [https://perma.cc/7HE7-48F8]. See also “Mission” (2019), online: Convenant Health <www.
covenanthealth.ca> [https://perma.cc/RH4W-KABK].
35. [1988] 1 SCR 30, 44 DLR (4th) 385. In concluding that the administrative structure for granting
permission for abortion set out in the Criminal Code did not comport with the principles of fundamental
justice, then Chief Justice Dickson argued: “Consider then the case of a pregnant married woman who
wishes to apply for a therapeutic abortion certificate because she fears that her psychological health
would be impaired seriously if she carried the foetus to term. The uncontroverted evidence reveals that
there are many areas in Canada where such a woman would simply not have access to a therapeutic
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Morgentaler, the Court concluded that a federal Criminal Code defence
had to be uniformly available to all who could avail themselves of it,
regardless of their location in Canada. The MAiD exceptions to the ban
on assisting a suicide operate in a similar way as the abortion permission
system worked. It is therefore legally problematic if access to MAiD
differs dramatically across the country.
II. Section 2(a) and freedom of religion under the Charter
1. Individual freedom of religion
The Supreme Court decision in Multani v Commission Scolaire MargueriteBourgeoys outlines the Court’s approach to section 2(a) in the most
common kind of challenge.36 The decision represented a classic freedom of
religion dilemma. A school board had a rule prohibiting bringing weapons
to school. This was a rule of “general applicability”—it applied to all
students, faculty, and guests coming on to school grounds. Weapons were
prohibited to all. The rights claimant was a young student and member
of the Sikh faith who wanted permission to wear a ceremonial dagger
(known as a kirpan) to school. He sincerely believed his faith required
wearing a kirpan at all times. He wanted an exception to the general rule—
an accommodation for his religious beliefs. As a compromise, the claimant
offered to ensure that the kirpan was sealed and sewn up in his clothing.
He could still satisfy the tenets of his faith but the school board’s “no
weapons” policy would be respected in its intent, as the kirpan would be
inaccessible as a “weapon.” He argued that the state’s objective of public
safety would still be achieved with this compromise. The school board
disagreed.
Justice Charron wrote the majority decision. She began with an
analytical argument about the interaction between sections 2(a) and 1 of
the Charter. The Court’s freedom of religion jurisprudence had yet to make
clear whether section 2(a) protected an almost absolute right that could
only be limited through an Oakes analysis at section 1. She acknowledged
that this was not a settled question, and that the parties themselves could
abortion. She may live in an area where no hospital has four doctors; no therapeutic abortion committee
can be created. Equally, she may live in a place where the treatment functions of the nearby hospitals
do not satisfy the definition of “accredited hospital” in s. 251(6). Or she may live in a province where
the provincial government has imposed such stringent requirements on hospitals seeking to create
therapeutic abortion committees that no hospital can qualify. Alternatively, our hypothetical woman
may confront a therapeutic abortion committee in her local hospital which defines “health” in purely
physical terms or which refuses to countenance abortions for married women. In each of these cases,
it is the administrative structures and procedures established by s. 251 itself that would in practice
prevent the woman from gaining the benefit of the defence held out to her in s. 251(4)” (ibid at 70).
36. 2006 SCC 6 [Multani].
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not agree on the proper approach. The rights claimant (Multani) argued
that an absolute ban on the wearing of a kirpan was a clear violation of
section 2(a) that must be justified under section 1. The Attorney General
of Quebec as intervenor conceded there was an infringement of religious
liberty in prohibiting the carrying of a kirpan. The Attorney General of
Quebec argued that freedom of religion can be limited within section
2(a) itself: it is not an almost absolute right. The school board argued
that freedom of religion was not infringed because the right guaranteed
by section 2(a) “must be limited by imperatives of public order, safety,
and health, as well as by the rights and freedoms of others.”37 Justice
Charron acknowledged: “[t]his Court has clearly recognized that freedom
of religion can be limited when a person’s freedom to act in accordance
with his or her beliefs may cause harm to or interfere with the rights of
others”38 She also pointed out that the Court in other Charter contexts has
stressed the advantages of reconciling competing rights under section 1. To
illustrate this preference, she quoted from B(R) v Children’s Aid Society of
Metropolitan Toronto, “it appears sounder to leave to the state the burden
of justifying the restrictions it has chosen. Any ambiguity or hesitation
should be resolved in favour of individual rights.”39 She noted that Multani
did not involve the reconciliation of two constitutional rights and therefore
a balancing under section 1 was more appropriate to the context.
It is significant that Justice Charron’s preference for balancing under
section 1 was much dependent on the specific situation Multani captured,
that is the balancing of an individual right against a state policy that the
state should bear the burden of justifying. There was no other rights holder
with a strong interest in the outcome of this case. While other students
and staff at the school have an interest in a safe environment, this can
be characterized as a generalized or diffuse interest without a specific
constitutional framework to bring it to the fore. This represents a different
scenario than a contest between two identifiable and obvious competing
rights holders, as evidenced in the context of MAiD. Whether it would
require a different methodology for resolving claims or not, a MAiD case
would present a challenge to the classic case law.
In finding a violation of section 2(a) in Multani, Justice Charron
summarized the test as follows: the claimant must demonstrate (1) that
he or she sincerely believes in a practice or belief that has a nexus with
religion, and (2) that the impugned conduct of a third party interferes, in
37.
38.
39.

Ibid at para 25.
Ibid at para 26.
Ibid, citing [1995] 1 SCR 315 at paras 109-110, 122 DLR (4th) 1, Justice La Forest.
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a manner that is non-trivial or not insubstantial, with his or her ability to
act in accordance with that practice or belief.40 This remains the governing
approach to section 2(a) in the classic freedom of religion contest. In
another significant decision on section 2(a), Alberta v Hutterian Brethren
of Wilson Colony, then Chief Justice McLachlin, who wrote the majority
reasons, began her judgment with a brief outline of what is meant by the
phrase “more than trivial or insubstantial” in step one of the Multani test.41
At issue was a provincial law requiring photos on all driver’s licences. The
Hutterite claimants argued it violated their freedom of religion to require
photos, as their belief system prohibits the capturing of an individual’s
image. Chief Justice McLachlin elaborated that in order for a violation of
section 2(a) to be made out, “it would need to be shown that the claimants’
‘religious beliefs or conduct might reasonably or actually be threatened’
by the universal photo requirement….Evidence of a state-imposed cost
or burden would not suffice; there would need to be evidence that such
a burden was ‘capable of interfering with religious belief or practice.’”42
This line of argument might become relevant in addressing the extent
of any burden imposed by legislative requirements around MAiD. For
example, the compromise of requiring an objecting physician to offer an
effective referral to a non-objecting colleague might well be described as
a “trivial” or insubstantial infringement of religious freedom; it might be
a state-imposed cost or burden, but not one that interferes with religious
belief or practice.43 MAiD cases could offer the Court an opportunity to
consider the boundaries of section 2(a) protection itself, before the state
becomes involved in justifying limits under section 1.
2. Institutional freedom of religion: faith-influenced institutions and
MAiD
In Loyola, the Court addressed the communal aspect of religious beliefs.
It held that religious communities are protected by section 2(a), but the
majority left open the question of whether a religious corporate entity
could claim protection.44 At issue in the case was a challenge from a private
40. Multani, supra note 36 at para 34.
41. 2009 SCC 37 at para 32 [Hutterian Brethren]. For a discussion on the need to clarify the nontrivial/not insubstantial language in step one of the Multani test, see Howard Kislowicz, “Loyola
High School v Attorney General of Quebec: On Non-Triviality and the Charter Value of Religious
Freedom” (2015) 71:13 SCLR 331.
42. Hutterian Brethren, supra note 41 at para 34 [emphasis added].
43. See discussion at note 71.
44. For a cogent analysis of the difference between the community and corporate aspect of
communal protection, see JK Donlevy, Kevin P Feehan & Peter Bowal, “A Community’s Right to
Freedom of Religion: Loyola High School v Quebec” in Dwight Newman, ed, Religious Freedom and
Communities (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2015).
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Catholic boys’ school to a Quebec provincial curriculum requirement that
mandates the teaching of world religions from a neutral and objective
perspective. Pursuant to section 22 of the legislation, the Minister of
Education can grant an exemption from the program requirements if the
proposed alternative program is deemed to be “equivalent.”45 A majority
of the seven-member bench held that it was unnecessary to decide whether
institutions are protected by section 2(a) of the Charter as Loyola was
entitled to administrative review of the Minister’s decision not to grant
an exemption in this case. The Minister is Charter-bound to exercise her
discretion in a manner that “respects the values underlying the grant of
her decision-making authority, including the Charter-protected religious
freedom of the members of the Loyola community who seek to offer and
wish to receive a Catholic education.”46 In urging the Minister to embrace
Charter values, Justice Abella writing for the four-judge plurality noted:
“[r]eligious freedom must therefore be understood in the context of a
secular, multicultural and democratic society with a strong interest in
protecting dignity and diversity, promoting equality, and ensuring the
vitality of a common belief in human rights.”47 Religious freedom is
therefore not absolute and unqualified from a Charter perspective. It is
influenced and perhaps even defined by its interplay with other Charter
values. In this case, the Court held that the Minister did not give adequate
consideration to freedom of religion. The matter was remitted back for her
reconsideration.
Then Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Moldaver, on behalf of
the remaining three judges, held in obiter that section 2(a) could extend
to protecting institutional freedom of religion claims. They argued this
was a necessary corollary to the individual and collective nature of
religious expression. Many individuals express their sincerely held
beliefs through their religious institutions: “[t]he individual and collective
aspects of freedom of religion are indissolubly intertwined. The freedom
of religion of individuals cannot flourish without freedom of religion for
the organizations through which those individuals express their religious
practices and through which they transmit their faith.”48 Obviously, context
is key, and religious institutions are not entitled to the protection in all
situations and for all purposes. This group of three judges fashioned a test
for determining when section 2(a) can extend to an institutional claim:
45.
46.
47.
48.

Loyola, supra note 28 at para 1.
Ibid at para 34.
Ibid at para 47.
Ibid at para 94.
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“On the submissions before us, and given the collective aspect of
religious freedom long established in our jurisprudence, we conclude
that an organization meets the requirements for s. 2(a) protection if (1)
it is constituted primarily for religious purposes, and (2) its operation
accords with these religious purposes.”49

The judges left open the scope of this protection as meriting clarification
in future cases. It was clear to them that regardless of the parameters,
Loyola would fit the test: “[i]t is a non-profit religious corporation
constituted for the purpose of offering a Jesuit education to children within
Quebec’s Catholic religious community. It has operated for over a century
in accordance with this religious educational purpose.”50
Notably, in applying the test it fashioned for institutional protection,
the minority deviated somewhat from the strictness of its own language. In
application, it treated the two requirements (constitution and operation) as
an “or” proposition, not an “and.” While the test requires an organization be
“constituted primarily for religious purposes,” in considering the facts of
this case, the minority only asked: “[i]s Loyola’s claimed belief that it must
teach ethics and its own religion from the Catholic perspective consistent
with its organizational purpose and operation?”51 In concluding it was,
the minority stated that “Loyola’s belief in its religious obligation to teach
Catholicism and ethics from a Catholic perspective is consistent with its
organizational purpose and operation.”52 This emphasis on “consistency”
with purpose is not the same as requiring an organization to be “constituted
primarily for the purpose” in order to qualify for protection under section
2(a). If consistency with purpose is all that is required, it may be easier for
an institution to argue its refusal to allow MAiD is legitimate. One could
argue that a faith-influenced institution operates consistently if it defines
its purpose as offering faith-influenced care. In other words, the way the
minority applied its own test seems to allow more space for institutions
to self-describe or self-define. The way the test is worded in the abstract
suggests a more neutral or objective approach to assessing an institution’s
purpose. For faith-influenced institutions, it is easier to satisfy a test for
section 2(a) protection that does not require the institution to show it was
constituted primarily for the purpose of providing faith-influenced care. It
is also easier for the institution to self-define as operating within a faith
tradition, as opposed to satisfying an objective assessment.

49.
50.
51.
52.

Ibid at para 100 [emphasis added].
Ibid at 101.
Ibid at 140 [emphasis added].
Ibid at 143 [emphasis added].
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Loyola therefore offers the Court’s first pass at the institutional
question. Neither set of reasons suggests that a religious institution is
entitled to section 2(a) protection in all contexts. The minority opens the
door under restricted circumstances, though the contours of the boundaries
of protection are uncertain. The majority leaves the question open, but
suggests that religious freedom must be assessed in the context of other
Charter values. If the majority view prevails, provinces would have an
obligation to consider Charter values in any limits imposed or negotiated
with institutions in the delivery of health services. In considering its
role, governments would be guided by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Mouvement laïque québécois v Saguenay (City) on the state’s duty of
religious neutrality.53
3. State neutrality on religious matters
The conflict in Saguenay arose after the Mayor of the city refused to
stop opening council meetings with a public prayer and remove religious
symbolism that adorned the chambers. A citizen who regularly attended
meetings complained of a violation of his rights under sections 3 and 10
the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. Section 3 provides:
“[e]very person is the possessor of the fundamental freedoms, including
freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of opinion, freedom
of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association.”54
Section 10 states: “[e]very person has a right to full and equal recognition
and exercise of his human rights and freedoms, without distinction,
exclusion or preference based on…religion. Discrimination exists where
such a distinction, exclusion or preference has the effect of nullifying or
impairing such right.”55 The Court described section 2(a) of the Canadian
Charter as a companion to these rights and concluded that because of
their similarity, the analyses should inform each other.56 While there is no
express duty for the state to remain neutral on matters of religion, such an
obligation has evolved in both jurisprudence and scholarly analysis.57 The
Court concluded:
“When all is said and done, the state’s duty to protect every person’s
freedom of conscience and religion means that it may not use its powers
53. 2015 SCC 16 [Saguenay].
54. Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, CQLR, c C-12, s 3.
55. Ibid at s 10.
56. Saguenay, supra note 53 at para 67.
57. Ibid at paras 71, 73, citing Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v
Lafontaine (Village), 2004 SCC 48 at paras 66-67, Justice LeBel; Richard Moon, “Freedom of
Religion Under the Charter of Rights: the Limit of State Neutrality” (2012) 45:2 UBC L Rev 497 at
507.
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in such a way as to promote the participation of certain believers or nonbelievers in public life to the detriment of others. It is prohibited from
adhering to one religion to the exclusion of all others.”58

Of particular significance for our purposes is the way the Court framed
its approach to claims that the state has violated its duty to remain neutral.
It held: “[i]n a case like this one in which a complaint of discrimination
based on religion concerns a state practice, the alleged breach of the duty
of neutrality must be established by proving that the state is professing,
adopting or favouring one belief to the exclusion of all others…and that
the exclusion has resulted in interference with the complainant’s freedom
of conscience and religion.”59 The Supreme Court has already determined
that hospitals are “government actors” and therefore subject to the Charter
when delivering provincially-regulated medical services. In Eldridge v
British Columbia (Attorney General), Justice LaForest held:
“while hospitals may be autonomous in their day-to-day operations,
they act as agents for the government in providing the specific medical
services set out in the Act. The Legislature, upon defining its objective
as guaranteeing access to a range of medical services, cannot evade
its obligations under…the Charter to provide those services without
discrimination by appointing hospitals to carry out that objective. In so
far as they do so, hospitals must conform with the Charter.”60

If hospitals are state agents as described in Eldridge, then an
institutional decision not to provide MAiD can be characterized as a
“government” decision. When that decision is made because of religious
or conscientious reasons, and when the institution is claiming Charter
protections for freedom of religion, this is a government position. Saguenay
suggests this should not be permitted. A province that supports a faithinfluenced institution that refuses to provide MAiD is arguably “adopting”
or “favouring” the faith of the institution’s founders or Board of Directors
to the exclusion of others. This constitutes a violation of the conscientious
or religious rights of taxpayers who do not share the institution’s faith,
58. Saguenay, supra note 53 at para 76.
59. Ibid at para 83.
60. [1997] 3 SCR 624 at para 51, 151 DLR (4th) 577 [Eldridge]. Eldridge was distinguished from the
context of Stoffman v Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 3 SCR 483, 76 DLR (4th) 700 [Stoffman]
where the Court held that a hospital’s governing Board of Directors was not subject to the Charter
as a government entity when making decisions that do not implicate government policy. Stoffman
concerned a challenge to mandatory retirement rules in the Board’s granting of hospital privileges.
See Martha Jackman, “The Application of the Canadian Charter in the Health Law Context” (2001)
9:2 Health L Rev 22 at 24 for an analysis of why Eldridge means that the Charter applies to hospitals,
physicians and other health care providers who act as agents for the state in delivering publicly-funded
health care.
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and cannot access a legal medical service in that institution. This is an
interpretation of Saguenay that offers the broadest protection for a secular
health care policy decision model. It is not however, the only way to look
at the neutrality dilemma.
Richard Moon distinguishes between religious values, which may be
supported by the state, and religious practices that demand neutrality.61
He argues that the state must remain neutral towards only religious belief
systems that address spiritual or worldly matters and that are confined to the
sphere of private life (like for example the proper forms of worship).62 On
the other hand, where religious values are implicated in “worldly concerns
or civic issues,” these must be debated on their merits, “on their conception
of human good or public welfare.”63 Saguenay and state neutrality under
this divided view represents a more challenging way to approach the
limits of faith in institutional health care. A faith-influenced institution
could argue that MAiD is a “public welfare issue” around which there is
legitimate and evident debate. The decision to decriminalize MAiD and
its highly regulated delivery, reinforce that it is at least in part a political
matter. A faith-influenced institution might be able to successfully argue
in court that it represents not only the practices of religious communities
that do not support MAiD, but also acts as a space where the debate over
spiritual values can accommodate different viewpoints.
Ultimately, the concern over state neutrality leans towards the view
that institutions that receive significant public funding not be governed
by religious practices. As Moon argues, “[a] religious belief should not
play a role in political decision-making if the action it calls for is spiritual
in character (relating simply to spiritual concerns, or involving the
worshipping or honouring of God).”64 An institutional refusal to allow
MAiD because the particular faith does not believe in it, sounds more like
“worship” than politically legitimate debate over values and ethics.
III. Application of jurisprudence to MAiD
1. Freedom of religion and the practice of medicine
There has already been an unsuccessful court challenge to an effective
referral requirement that considers the Charter rights of physicians and
engages the issue of reconciling competing rights.65 Five individual
61. Moon, supra note 57.
62. Ibid at 524.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid at 520.
65. See Christian Medical and Dental Society of Canada v College of Physicians and Surgeons of
Ontario, 2019 ONCA 393 [CMDSC v CPSO].
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physicians and several physician advocacy organizations challenged
two policies of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (the
College) that require physicians with conscientious or religious objections
to providing care make an effective referral to a non-objecting colleague.
In Ontario, the College has opted for an “effective referral” regime to
accommodate individual conscientious or religious objections to providing
a service.66 Policy 2-15 states:
Where physicians are unwilling to provide certain elements of care for
reasons of conscience or religion, an effective referral to another healthcare provider must be provided to the patient. An effective referral
means a referral made in good faith, to a non-objecting, available, and
accessible physician or other health-care professional, or agency. The
referral must be made in a timely manner to allow patients to access
care. Patients must not be exposed to adverse clinical outcomes due to a
delayed referral. Physicians must not impede access to care for existing
patients, or those seeking to become patients.67

Policy 2-15 covers broad human rights and non-discrimination
obligations, and was incorporated with identical wording into specific
guidance on MAiD in Policy 4-16. The College sees an effective referral
regime as the appropriate compromise between patient entitlement to legal
medical services and the protection and support of physicians who have
religious or conscience objections to the service:
In order to uphold patient autonomy and facilitate the decision-making
process, physicians must provide the patient with information about all
options for care that may be available or appropriate to meet the patient’s
clinical needs, concerns, and/or wishes. Physicians must not withhold
information about the existence of any procedure or treatment because it
conflicts with their conscience or religious beliefs.
Where a physician declines to provide medical assistance in dying for
reasons of conscience or religion, the physician must not abandon the
patient. An effective referral must be provided. An effective referral
means a referral made in good faith, to a non-objecting, available, and
accessible physician, nurse practitioner or agency. The referral must be
made in a timely manner to allow the patient to access medical assistance
in dying. Patients must not be exposed to adverse clinical outcomes due
to delayed referrals.68
66. For an analysis of the College’s policy in the context of reproductive services, see Daphne
Gilbert, “Let Thy Conscience Be Thy Guide (but not My Guide): Physicians and the Duty to Refer”
(2017) 10:2 McGill JL & Health 47.
67. CMDSC v CPSO, supra note 65 at para 18, citing the College of Physicians and Surgeons of
Ontario, “Policy 2-15: Professional Obligations and Human Rights” (2015).
68. CMDSC v CPSO, supra note 65 at para 23, citing the College of Physicians and Surgeons of
Ontario, “Policy 4-16: Medical Assistance in Dying” (2015) [emphasis added].
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What is the freedom of religion argument for physicians to an effective
referral regime? The main way that objections to referral are described
is as a “complicity” offence.69 Those who have strong conscientious and
religious objections to performing a service (MAiD, abortion, providing
contraception, etc) argue that referring a patient to another non-objecting
physician still implicates the objector in that service. Objectors believe
there is something “wrong” or “sinful” in the service and therefore refuse to
be complicit in its delivery. The College expressly rejects a broad definition
of “providing a service” and by implication dismisses the legitimacy of
complicity-based objections to effective referral requirements. The MAiD
policy includes this final caveat: “the College does not consider providing
the patient with an ‘effective referral’ as ‘assisting’ in providing medical
assistance in dying.”70
The applicants argued the policy violated both sections 2(a) and 15 of
the Charter. They lost at first instance on the basis that while the policy
is a violation of freedom of religion, it is justified under section 1 of the
Charter. The Divisional Court did not consider freedom of conscience
and dismissed entirely the section 15 claim.71 The Ontario Court of Appeal
agreed with the “thorough and cogent analysis” of the Court below and
dismissed the appeal.72
69. See Amy J Sepinwall, “Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for Religious Exemptions
in Hobby Lobby’s Wake” (2015) 82:4 U Chicago L Rev 1897. See also Douglas NeJaime & Reva
Siegel, “Conscience Wars in Transnational Perspective: Religious Liberty, Third-Party Harm, and
Pluralism” in Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld, eds, The Conscience Wars: Rethinking the
Balance between Religion, Identity, and Equality (United States: Cambridge University Press, 2018)
187 at 219. The authors conclude: “In seeking exemptions from laws that religious claimants assert
make them complicit in sins of their fellow citizens, religious claimants may speak as a minority and
yet assert what have long been the norms of the majority against those whose rights the law has only
recently and fragilely come to protect. Under these circumstances, limiting accommodation in ways
that respect the convictions of the believer and one’s fellow citizens is the most pluralism-promoting
path.” NeJaime and Siegel were writing in the context of complicity wars in what they term the
“culture wars” over LGBTQ and abortion rights. Given how recently Canada legalized MAiD, it could
well be argued to be a fragile “right.”
70. CMDSC v CPSO, supra note 65 at para 23, citing CPSO Policy, supra note 32 [emphasis added].
71. The Christian Medical and Dental Society of Canada v College of Physicians and Surgeons of
Ontario, 2018 ONSC 579. After noting (at para 117) that the parties devoted little attention to their
section 15(1) claim during the hearing, the Divisional Court held there was no equality violation for
three reasons. First (at para 129), the effective referral policy is an attempt to take the specific concerns
of the objectors into account; second (at para 130), the policy has an ameliorative effect for vulnerable
groups seeking medical services; and third, the Court concluded (at para 131), “The burdens imposed
on objecting physicians, for whom the options for compliance with the effective referral requirements
of the Policies are not satisfactory, pertain ultimately to the nature of their practice of medicine. It is
important in this context to note that there is no constitutionally protected right to practice medicine
as discussed further below.” The Court of Appeal agreed with the Divisional Court’s reasoning noting
that while the appellants renewed their section 15(1) objections in their facta, it was not raised in oral
argument (CMDSC v CPSO, supra note 65 at para 90).
72. CMDSC v CPSO, supra note 65 at para 8.
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In determining that an effective referral policy violates section 2(a),
the Court disagreed with the College’s position that any interference with
freedom of religion is trivial or insubstantial. Justice Strathy, for the Court,
noted:
While it is true that s.2(a) is internally limited, that not all religious
conduct is protected by the Charter, and that context is important in
considering whether interference with religious freedom is “trivial or
insubstantial”, the specific contextual features identified by the College
are more relevant to the proportionality analysis under s.1.73

The Court agreed that some of the individual appellants are not free to
practice medicine in accordance with their religious beliefs because of the
effective referral requirement, and that the specific context of their selfregulated profession is better addressed under minimal impairment and in
the final balancing under section 1.74 This reasoning suggests that courts
are wary of engaging in a robust analysis under section 2(a) as to the scope
and limits of freedom of religion, preferring to consider only whether
the belief is sincere before moving on to section 1. Given the evidential
burden that would be placed on challengers to refute an allegation that a
breach of rights was only “trivial or insubstantial,” shifting the analysis
to section 1 makes sense in cases where it is clear there is at least some
evident encumbrance on religious freedom.
Justice Strathy next considered section 1 arguments, concluding that
the pressing and substantial objective of the policy is, as argued by the
College and found by the Divisional Court, “the facilitation of equitable
[patient] access to [health care] services.”75 In the reasons that follow, the
Court relied to a substantial degree on the submissions of the intervenors,
and in particular LEAF, Dying with Dignity Canada and the Canadian
HIV/AIDS Legal Network. The work of the intervenors was evident
in the Court’s focus on the equality interests of particularly vulnerable
patients who may be even more reliant than others on an effective referral
model.76 A policy of effective referral is rationally connected to facilitating
equitable access to services as a matter of “logic and common sense.”77
With respect to minimal impairment, the Court contextualized the
claim in two significant ways. First, it located the role of the appellant
73. Ibid at para 77.
74. Ibid. The Court concluded that the evidentiary record was insufficient to support an analysis of
freedom of conscience and that it was inappropriate to explore the contours of that clause in a case
with robust evidence (ibid at para 85).
75. Ibid at para 101.
76. Ibid at para 107.
77. Ibid at para 113.
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physicians as “gatekeepers” and a “key point of access” to the services in
question for a majority of patients.78 Given how difficult it can be to find
a family physician in Canada, and since for most patients, their family
doctor is key to navigating a complex system of specialists and followup treatment, effective referral policies protect patients who depend on
their family doctor for coordination of care and initial counselling and
information provision. The second important context was the nature of
the services to which the appellants objected. In addition to MAiD, the
appellants objected to providing effective referrals for other services
including, “abortion, contraception (including emergency contraception,
tubal ligation, and vasectomies), infertility treatment for heterosexual
and homosexual patients, prescription of erectile dysfunction medication,
[and] gender re-assignment surgery”79 The Court accepted that these
issues are difficult for patients to raise and discuss, and noted that it “is
impossible to conceive of more private, emotional or challenging issues for
any patient.”80 Abortion and MAiD in particular, “carry the stigmatizing
legacy of several centuries of criminalization grounded in religious and
secular morality.”81 The combination of stigma and the vulnerability of
patients in need of the services82 heightens the importance of the family
physician’s gatekeeper role. Given that context, the effective referral
policy was minimally impairing.
The appellants advocated for a “self-referral model” as less-impairing
than an effective referral policy.83 They argued that having a centralized
government agency with lists of MAiD providers would allow patients
to make direct contact for a referral, without the objecting physician
acting as a go-between. The only obligation on a physician would be to
provide the phone number or website for the agency. The Court of Appeal
agreed with the court below that a self-referral model entails a real risk
that vulnerable patients will have delayed or no access to the requested

78. Ibid at paras 118, 124.
79. Ibid at para 121.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid at para 123.
82. While all patients are vulnerable in the balance of power with their physician, the Court
emphasizes the particular vulnerability of certain groups including, “patients with financial, social,
educational or emotional challenges; patients who are old, young, poor or addicted to drugs; patients
with mental health challenges or physical or intellectual disabilities; patients facing economic,
linguistic, cultural or geographic barriers; and patients who do not have the skills, abilities or resources
to navigate their own way through a vast and complicated health care system” (ibid at para 121).
Clearly this represents a large fraction of many family medicine practices.
83. Ibid at paras 126-127. Self-referral might include a public information line with information or
a coordination service or registry.
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medical services.84 It pointed out that the fundamental weakness in the
appellant’s proposed alternatives to effective referral was the same as
identified by the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Hutterian
Brethren, that is “the alternatives proposed by the appellants and some
of the intervenors are directed to minimizing the burden of the Policies
on objecting physicians, not to advancing the goal of equitable access to
abortion, MAiD, contraception and sexual and reproductive health care.”85
In analysing the salutary and deleterious effects of the policy, the Court
found “much assistance” in the arguments of Dying with Dignity Canada,
which emphasized that “patients should not bear the burden of managing
the consequences of physicians’ religious objections.”86 Interestingly,
the Court noted that this compromise of effective referral is not optimal
for patients, who lose the support and personalized care of their primary
physician at a time of great vulnerability and stress.87 No party to the case
argued that objectors should not be accommodated in any way, so it is of
note that the Court acknowledged that even an effective referral model
constitutes a harm to some patients.88
The CPSO decision represents a victory for patient interests. The
unanimous decision, written by Justice Strathy, is well-reasoned and
follows an equally strong Divisional Court judgment. It should bolster
similar policies in provinces that use the language of “effective transfer of
care”89 and it serves as a compelling basis for challenging policies like that
of Manitoba which expressly permit physicians not to refer patients.90 It
is helpful that the Court concentrated its analysis on equality of access to
the services in question, and its reference to stigma and vulnerability are
84. Ibid at para 128.
85. Ibid at para 157.
86. Ibid at para 185.
87. Ibid at para 187.
88. In the United Kingdom, the decision on whether to accommodate religious or conscience beliefs
is guided by the “Liberal Model of Conscientious Exemptions.” This model has three defining criteria
A. The liberal state should generally refrain from passing moral judgement on the content of the
beliefs which give rise to a claim for conscientious exemption;
B. The liberal state should neither privilege nor disadvantage religious beliefs over nonreligious ones when considering whether to grant a conscientious exemption; and
C. The liberal state should grant conscientious exemptions to claimants who sincerely hold
a religious or non-religious conscientious objection which would not disproportionately
impact on the rights of others or the public interest.
Point “C” and the reference to “disproportionate impact” is evocative of our section 1 analysis and
reinforces that a patient’s interest in access to MAiD must be taken into account in balancing religious
or conscience rights. See John Adenitire, “Conscientious Exemptions in a Liberal State” in John
Adenitire, ed, Religious Beliefs and Conscientious Exemptions in a Liberal State (Hart Publishing:
Oxford, 2019) 247.
89. See e.g. CPSO Policy, supra note 32 at 5.
90. CPSM Standard, supra note 30.
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helpful to the symbolic arguments in favour of effective referral. While
Strathy JA focused on the practical consequences of delayed or no access,
his argument is equally applicable to the less tangible consequences of
broad religious or conscientious objector protections. Physicians occupy
a privileged space in a relationship with patients, with considerably more
power and specialized knowledge. For many patients, a physician’s
objection to providing legally-available services will be experienced as
judgment for requesting that service. To allow a physician to opt out of
caring for a vulnerable patient may mean that the patient does not feel
justified in wanting the particular service, may be ashamed of having made
the request in the first place, and may have heightened shame at having to
ask again. The symbolic statement of moral and/or ethical disapproval is
made explicit and stands as a strong disincentive for pursuing a course of
treatment.
The CPSO decision may also be helpful in the broader context of
refusals to provide care by faith-influenced institutions.91 While the case
centered on individual physicians and the accommodations accorded to
them, much of the language and reasoning is equally applicable in an
institutional context. It is also true that an effective referral model for
individual physicians is meaningless for hospitalized patients in faithinfluenced institutions that refuse to allow MAiD to be performed by any
physician on the premises.
2. Faith-influenced institutions and refusal to treat
If the case were litigated, publicly-funded Catholic or other faith-influenced
institutions would be unlikely to meet the minority decision which set out
the Loyola test for institutional section 2(a) protection.92 Their mandate as
health care providers would likely not satisfy either step. A hospital is not
constituted “primarily for religious purposes.” The mission statements of
Catholic hospitals do not suggest otherwise. For example, St. Michael’s
Hospital in Toronto describes itself this way:

91. Since the decision in CMDSC v CPSO, supra note 65, members of Ontario’s Progressive
Conservative party have voiced their support for legislating measures to protect the conscience rights
of Ontario’s healthcare providers, though the government has yet to provide details on the content
or timeline of such measures. See Victoria Gibson, “Ontario PC Members Rubber Stamp Call for
Conscience Rights Legislation as New Federal MAID Bill Rolls Out,” iPolitics (26 February 2020),
online: <ipolitics.ca> [https://perma.cc/YRK8-2KEU].
92. As set out in text accompanying supra note 28. That test requires that to claim institutional 2(a)
protection an organization must show that (1) it is constituted primarily for religious purposes, and (2)
its operation accords with these religious purposes. This assumes the entire Court adopted the views
of the Loyola minority. Of course, it could fashion a different test.
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St. Michael’s Hospital is a Catholic teaching and research hospital
founded by the Sisters of St. Joseph in 1892 to care for the sick and
poor of Toronto’s inner city….As downtown Toronto’s adult trauma
centre, the hospital is a hub for neurosurgery, complex cardiac and
cardiovascular care, diabetes and osteoporosis care, minimally invasive
surgery and care of the homeless and disadvantaged. St. Michael’s is also
one of the province’s major sites of care for critically ill patients.93

Other than identifying itself as a Catholic institution, its mission
statement contains only this reference to any spiritual mission:
“[p]roviding exemplary physical, emotional and spiritual care for each of
our patients and their families.”94 Similarly, the Bruyère Centre in Ottawa
has this Mission Statement:
We excel in the provision of evidence based health care and services
for the vulnerable and medically complex, with a focus on persons who
require sub-acute, geriatric or palliative care. Inspired by our founder,
Mother Élisabeth Bruyère, we are a Catholic health care organization
that optimizes the quality of life of people within the diverse community
we serve in French and English. We do this through our commitment
to excellence, education, research and innovation, regional partnerships,
and bringing care closer to home.95
93. “Who we Are” (2019), online: St. Michael’s Hospital <www.stmichaelshospital.com> [https://
perma.cc/K76U-WRB7].
94. “Strategic Plan 2015-18” (2015) at 7, online (pdf): St. Michael’s Hospital Academic Family
Health Team and Department of Family and Community Medicine <www.stmichaelshospital.com>
[https://perma.cc/4H8K-RYA6].The full mission statement is:
“St. Michael’s Hospital is a Catholic academic health care provider, fully affiliated with
the University of Toronto and committed to innovative patient care, teaching and research.
Established in 1892 by the Sisters of St. Joseph to care for the sick and poor, St. Michael’s
Hospital remains dedicated to treating all with respect, compassion and dignity.
At St. Michael’s Hospital, we recognize the value of every person and are guided by our
commitment to excellence and leadership. We demonstrate this by:
• Providing exemplary physical, emotional and spiritual care for each of our patients and their
families
• Balancing the continued commitment to the care of the poor and those most in need with the
provision of highly specialized services to a broader community.
• Building a work environment where each person is valued, respected and has an opportunity
for personal and professional growth
• Advancing excellence in health services education
• Fostering a culture of discovery in all of our activities and supporting exemplary health
sciences research
• Strengthening our relationships with universities, colleges, other hospitals, agencies and our
community
• Demonstrating social responsibility through the just use of our resources
The commitment of our staff, physicians, volunteers, students, community partners and
friends to our mission permits us to maintain a quality of presence and tradition of caring—
the hallmarks of St. Michael’s” (ibid).
95. “Mission, Vision and Values” (2019), online: Bruyère <www.bruyere.org> [https://perma.cc/
QM3C-3TRZ].
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These two institutions are reflective of Catholic hospitals across the
country. While situated in a historic attachment to Catholic founders, and
linked as a network of “Catholic health care providers” under various
umbrella organizations,96 Catholic hospitals provide care within a national
health care strategy governed by the Canada Health Act.97 In Loyola, the
four-person plurality judgment did not decide whether institutions could
claim section 2(a) protection but, as quoted above, Justice Abella more
broadly understood religious freedom as contextual and as co-existing
with equality rights and human rights, in a secular society.98 The reasons
why the minority found it an obvious case for Loyola was that its primary
mission was to live out the reasons for its foundation: to offer private
Catholic education to boys. The curriculum was designed to pass on the
teaching of Catholicism (hence its successful Charter challenge to the
Minister’s decision on enforcing a “neutral” provincial curriculum). Faithinfluenced institutions no doubt share a common historic commitment to
serving impoverished and vulnerable communities, but the Loyola court’s
reasoning that religious communities sometimes require institutions
or collectives to bring faith alive does not fit with the broad, inclusive,
scientific and public nature of government-regulated health care. Catholic
hospitals are not organized to give Catholics a community or collective
opportunity to live out their spiritual needs, and they do not primarily
fulfill that purpose as medical institutions. Esau describes the reason why
Loyola is deserving of community religious protection as stemming from
this view of the educational impact of private religious schools:
“Education at religious schools is not about taking a number of defined
courses and getting a degree, but is rather about a transformative journey,
where the extra-curriculum is as important at the curriculum, and where
the experience is relational. The student is not alone on a path, but rather
is part of a community travelling the path together.”99

These considerations are not as strong (or arguably present at all) in
faith-influenced institutions. While such an institution might argue that for
terminally-ill patients, the journey to death in hospital is transformative,
the lack of spiritual uniformity in staff, the fact that many patients do not
choose what hospital they end up in, and the fact that patient choice might
96. See e.g. “About CHSO,” online: Catholic Health Sponsors of Ontario <http://chco.ca> [https://
perma.cc/E9ZQ-DZC4]; “About Us” (2009), online: Catholic Health Alliance of Canada <www.chac.
ca> [https://perma.cc/8UWR-9HXB].
97. RSC 1985, c C-6.
98. Loyola, supra note 28 at para 47.
99. Alvin Esau, “Collective Freedom of Religion” in Dwight Newman, ed, Religious Freedom and
Communities (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2015) 77 at 85.
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be more influenced by where their physician has privileges, all suggest
that hospitals operate quite differently from schools.
Further, it is likely a court would find that hospitals do not operate
sufficiently in accordance with religious purposes, as required by the
second step of the minority’s Loyola test. It is incontrovertible that faithinfluenced institutions continue a legacy of care for the sick and the poor
that stretches back for centuries. St. Michael’s offers this “Affirmation
Statement” of its inclusivity:
To acknowledge the needs of the communities we serve, St. Michael’s
reiterates our longstanding commitment to affirm and protect the right to
accessible, inclusive, secure, and respectful health care for all patients,
including people living with HIV/AIDS, lesbians and gay men, their
partners and families, the poor, the homeless, persons with disabilities
and people with mental illnesses. It is the mission and tradition of St.
Michael’s to provide compassionate care in a welcoming environment,
embracing all races, cultures, classes, beliefs, ages, genders and sexual
orientations.100

This Affirmation Statement echoes back to the religious foundation of
hospitals as ministries to the poor and vulnerable, a powerful and laudable
history for Catholic institutions.
Despite this legacy, it is difficult to reconcile this Affirmation Statement
with an argument that the hospital is operating in accordance with a
religious purpose. The roots of care may well be informed by a religious
tradition, but the purpose of a hospital in a modern health-care context
is guided by scientific research, professional norms, non-discrimination,
economics, and broad public policy goals. Compassion, spiritual support,
and care for the vulnerable and sick are a significant part of what a faithinfluenced hospital strives to deliver, but its purpose is more strongly
aligned with that of secular hospitals—to provide the most advanced,
efficient, cutting-edge treatment with professionalism, science and ethical
health policy at the centre.
On the other hand, there is no doubt that Catholicism holds the sanctity
of life as a foundational spiritual belief. Faith-influenced hospitals may
argue that this basic premise is at the core of their ethos on best practices
in providing medical care. The sanctity of life could be an operating or
guiding principle of how health care is organized and delivered in these
institutions. If the minority test fashioned in Loyola is taken up by a
future court decision, and if the Court relies on an interpretation of the
100. “Affirmation Statement” (2019), online: St. Michael’s Hospital <www.stmichaelshospital.com>
[https://perma.cc/822N-G5PJ].
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test that focuses on how consistently an institution operates within its
stated purpose, faith-influenced hospitals may be legally strengthened in
their insistence to a right to deny MAiD on their premises for religious or
conscientious reasons.
In the Carter hearing before the Supreme Court, some religious
intervenors put forward a variant of this position. The Catholic Health
Alliance of Canada (the Alliance) argued:
“Faith-based health-care institutions are, by their very nature, religious.
They are confessional. They are founded on religious principles by
religious individuals, leaders, organizations or orders for expressly
religious purposes. Faith-based health-care institutions, such as
those represented by the Alliance, are extensions of the Church and
manifestations of a religious community.”101

The Alliance further argued that there is no difference between the
Catholic institution and the individuals who serve in it.102 It is clear
from the intervenor facta in Carter on this point that Catholic hospital
bodies anticipated a future need to take an institutional stand on the issue.
Resolving the question might require the Supreme Court to take a firm
position on whether and when institutions can claim a section 2(a) right. It
would also have to decide whether a faith-influenced hospital is, as Loyola
College was, operating within a primarily religious purpose..
3. Reconciling competing rights
In order to assess the scope of impact of an objecting physician and/
or institution, one must envision a hypothetical challenge. How will
this issue get to court to be resolved on a judicial level? There are two
likely scenarios. The first sees an objecting physician bringing a Charter
challenge to effective referral obligations promulgated by a provincial
regulatory authority, as has already happened in Ontario in the unsuccessful
bid to overturn a College of Physicians and Surgeons policy requiring
an effective referral.103 This kind of challenge by a physician involves
a proactive freedom of religion claim, with the responding regulatory
authority justifying the government position as a reasonable limit. Patients
are third parties with no formal role in the legal process.
Another way this issue could get to court would be by way of a patient
admitted to a faith-influenced institution and then forced into a transfer
because of a refusal to perform MAiD. This kind of challenge brings
101. Carter, supra note 1 (Factum of the Catholic Health Alliance at para 27), online: <www.scc-csc.
ca> [https://perma.cc/XTN6-SJX7].
102. Ibid at para 26.
103. CMDSC v CPSO, supra note 65.
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patient interests front and centre as the institution would be defending on
the grounds of religious freedom. This would raise an interesting dilemma
for a provincial government. In the provision of medical services,
hospitals are considered government entities, as they deliver a publiclyfunded service.104 The government therefore would need to take a position
on whether it supports a faith-influenced institution’s religious freedom in
refusing to provide MAiD. If it did not support the institution’s view on
this, it could intervene in the court challenge, but would need to indicate
its preferred remedy. As a party or intervenor, the government would be
limited by the dictates of state neutrality as set out in Saguenay, which is
outlined above.105 This kind of case has yet to materialize.
Either scenario asks courts to grapple with the reconciliation of
competing Charter rights. Patients have section 7, section 15 and section
2(a) rights to legally-available and appropriate medical treatment. Security
of the person encompasses not only bodily integrity but also protects
patients from undue state-imposed psychological stress. The denial of
treatment that is clinically warranted undoubtedly qualifies as a violation
of security of the person. Section 15 dictates that patients not face
discrimination based on their disability, which could extend to a denial
of MAiD on moral or ethical grounds leaving a person with a disability
with no choice but to continue suffering. Finally, as Justice Wilson noted
in Morgentaler, patients have section 2(a) freedom of conscience rights
when it comes to making decisions of profound and private importance.
The choice to die has to be one of the most profound decisions of one’s life.
It is for the patient’s conscience to dictate the choice, not the physician’s.
And yet, the practice of medicine puts physicians in difficult positions
when patients want to pursue options that a physician thinks are immoral
or unethical. We expect medical professionals to act with professionalism
and compassion, and some physicians strongly believe that these qualities
include practicing according to a set of religious or conscientious beliefs
or values. The reconciliation of patient and physician rights is no easy task.
The Supreme Court’s leading case on the reconciliation of competing
Charter rights is R v NS106 which considered when, if ever, a witness
must remove a niqab when testifying. The Court characterized the issue
as requiring an assessment of two competing Charter rights: section 2(a)
freedom of religion (for the witness) and the right to make full answer

104. Eldridge, supra note 60 at para 51.
105. Saguenay, supra note 53.
106. 2012 SCC 72 [NS].
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and defence (for the accused), protected by sections 7 and 11(d).107 The
majority noted, “our jurisprudence teaches that clashes between rights
should be approached by reconciling the rights through accommodation if
possible, and in the end, if a conflict cannot be avoided, by case-by-case
balancing.”108 In justifying a contextual approach instead of a strict rule,
the majority argued “[t]he need to accommodate and balance sincerely held
religious beliefs against other interests is deeply entrenched in Canadian
law. For over half a century this tradition has served us well. To depart
from it would set the law down a new road, with unknown twists and
turns.”109 In NS, accommodation of religious rights led to the requirement
of a hearing in every case on whether the salutary effects of making a
witness remove a niqab outweigh the deleterious effects. The reasoning
of the majority emphasized the historic and present-day importance of
religion and the primacy of accommodation. The case suggests that a
failure to accommodate religion in the face of a competing Charter claim
will only be countenanced if there is no compromise position. Freedom of
religion is not to be easily sacrificed, even where there are vital interests
in the balance.
In the context of MAiD, the NS framework requires legislators and
courts to give real effect to conscientious objection. It also provides some
guidance in fulfilling this deceptively simple statement in Carter: “we
underline that the Charter rights of patients and physicians will need to
be reconciled.”110 In lay terms, the dictionary definition of “reconcile”
offers: “to make consistent or congruous.”111 Synonyms include conciliate,
conform, coordinate, harmonize.112 The key in other words is the balancing
of two interests to come to a mutual solution. Full access to MAiD (for
those who qualify) must co-exist with the rights of physicians who do
not want to participate in the process. Provincial regulatory bodies, the
Colleges, have all endeavoured to strike the appropriate balance, as
discussed above. The more difficult compromise centers on institutional
objections which operate more like bans than accommodation. It is beyond
the purview of the legal analysis offered here to engage with the complex
ethical literature on MAiD. Is is notable however that scholars in that field
107. Ibid at para 7.
108. Ibid at para 52. The majority relied on the precedent case Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting
Corp, [1994] 3 SCR 835, 120 DLR (4th) 12, further refined in R v Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76.
109. NS supra note 106 at para 54.
110. Carter, supra note 1 at para 132.
111. “Reconcile” (2019), online: Merriam-Webster <www.merriam-webster.com> [https://perma.cc/
PFP4-D9BW].
112. “Thesaurus: Reconcile” (2019), online: Merriam-Webster <www.merriam-webster.com>
[https://perma.cc/GUZ5-P789].
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argue much more work should be done to consider what an appropriate
response might be to conscientious or religious objectors:
An important feature of ethical reasoning is to make explicit absolute
moral duties that are mutually exclusive through consideration of all
the values, rights, and duties involved in an ethical decision. From our
analysis it appears that there are at least two conflicting duties for any
conscientious objector to MAID: 1) the duty to respect the patient’s right
to life, liberty and security of the person, and 2) the freedom of religion or
conscience. The moral difficulty is that simply asserting a conscientious
objection to MAID does not automatically justify the normative
conclusion that this conscientious objection should be respected. The
assertion of a conscientious objection is simply the acknowledgement
that there are conflicting duties.113

The Supreme Court decision in Law Society of British Columbia v
Trinity Western University offers additional helpful guidance in assessing
whether an institution might be able to claim freedom of conscience and
religion rights.114 Trinity Western University (TWU) is an evangelical
Christian post-secondary institution that wants to open a law school. As a
condition of admission, it requires its students and faculty to adhere to a
religiously-based code of conduct, the Community Covenant Agreement
(Covenant), which prohibits “sexual intimacy that violates the sacredness
of marriage between a man and a woman.”115 The Covenant would prohibit
same sex intimacy and sex outside of marriage throughout the three years
of law school, even when students are off-campus in the privacy of their
own homes. The professional regulator in British Columbia voted not to
accredit TWU as an approved law school because of the Covenant. The
university responded with a challenge to this decision as a violation of its
section 2(a) rights.116
In assessing the section 2(a) claim, the Court found it unnecessary
to consider whether TWU possesses an institutional right to Charter

113. Timothy Christie, John Sloan, Dylan Dahlgren & Fred Koning, “Medical Assistance in Dying
in Canada: An Ethical Analysis of Conscientious and Religious Objections” (2016) 5 Bioéthique
Online 1 at 6. The authors conclude: “Given this ethical dilemma, professional organizations like
the Catholic Health Association, the Canadian Medical Association, and the Federal, Provincial,
Territorial, Expert Group on Physician Assisted Dying should complete their work. To date, they have
simply articulated one side of the argument, deriving a normative conclusion without any normative
justification. Furthermore, they have proposed a pragmatic solution that attempts to generate a “winwin” situation for everyone. Unfortunately, the result of this pragmatism is that the ethical dilemma
remains unanalyzed” (ibid at 9).
114. 2018 SCC 32 [TWU].
115. Trinity Western University v The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2016 ONCA 518 at para 23
[TWU v LSUC].
116. Trinity Western University v Law Society of British Columbia, 2015 BCSC 2326 at para 1.
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protection.117 The majority offered this observation as to the scope of
protection offered by the Charter: “[f]or many religions, community
is critical to manifesting faith. Whether through communal worship,
religious education, or good works, the community is often the public
face of religion. In other words, it is how the religion engages with the
world.”118 Notably however, the majority concluded:
While acknowledging this communal aspect, I underscore that religious
freedom is premised on the personal volition of individual believers.
Although religious communities may adopt their own rules and
membership requirements, the foundation of the community remains the
voluntary choice of individual believers to join together on the basis of
their common faith. Therefore, in the context of this appeal, I would
decline to find that TWU, as an institution, possesses rights under s. 2(a).
I note that, even if TWU did possess such rights, these would not extend
beyond those held by the individual members of the faith community.119

There are two important aspects to this conclusion in assessing whether
section 2(a) protects institutional rights. First, the majority is careful to
specify that its conclusion is made “in the context of this appeal.” This
leaves open the question of whether a different set of facts might warrant
a broader institutional rights approach.
Second, the majority suggests that even institutional rights would
not extend “beyond those held by the individual members of the faith
community.”120 Both Loyola and TWU are educational institutions with a
mission to serve students who choose those schools in part because of their
shared religious convictions. Both schools incorporate religious teachings
117. TWU, supra note 114 at para 61.
118. Ibid at para 217.
119. Ibid at para 219. The dissenting judgments had this to say about institutional Charter protections:
“While it may not be necessary to determine whether TWU, qua institution, enjoys a right to religious
freedom in its own right for the purposes of this appeal…in our view, ensuring full protection for
the ‘constitutionally protected communal aspects of…religious beliefs and practice’ requires more
than simply aggregating individual rights claims under the amorphous umbrella of an institution’s
‘community’....That being said, for the purposes of this appeal we adopt the majority’s description of
the rights-holder as the ‘TWU community’” (ibid at para 315).
120. Ibid at para 219. The majority’s comment seems to reject the “moral-association” account of
institutional conscience. In her paper, “Identifying the Institutional Religious Freedom Claimant”
(2018) 95:3 Can Bar Rev 707, Kathryn Chan canvasses two competing accounts of institutional
conscience that could justify extending 2(a) freedom to institutions. The first, “mission-operation
theory,” understands an institution as having a conscience that is expressed through its mission
and structure. The second, “moral-association theory” sees institutions as the means through which
individuals express their moral convictions. Without endorsing the approach, Chen concludes that the
“moral-association” theory provides a stronger basis for a constitutional claim, noting that the Loyola
decision seems to reveal the SCC’s preference for a “mission-operation” theory. For further discussion
on conceptions of corporations and institutional freedom of religion claims, see Howard Kislowicz,
“Business Corporations as Religious Freedom Claimants in Canada” (2017) 51:2-3 RJT 337.
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as a core component of the design of curriculum, the admission of students,
and the overall educational mission. In considering a challenge to MAiD,
hospitals do not share the same kind of cohesive, religiously-based mission
as private educational institutions. They are not made up of a uniform
staff, nor do they serve a primarily religious constituency. Patients do not
necessarily (and perhaps even rarely) choose their hospital based on its
religious affiliations. The difference between a private school and a public
hospital might be stark enough to warrant a different conclusion as to
whether section 2(a) protection extends to hospitals, even if the Supreme
Court conclusively decides that in some situations institutions can claim
freedom of religion.
On the other hand, the dissenting judgment in TWU may be influential
if a case arises that squarely addresses institutional rights. The dissent
noted the difficulty in adjudicating cases involving competing rights and
was critical of the framework established by Justice Abella’s decision in
Loyola.121 The dissent argued that conflicting rights cases are challenging
because “the stakes for parties are sometimes not fully appreciable by
those who do not share their experiences.”122 The dissent was particularly
concerned about a framework that suggested that Charter values have an
as important, even equal, position to Charter rights in analysis. The dissent
argued: “[w]e are in agreement with the Chief Justice and our colleague
Rowe J. that Charter values do not receive independent protection under the
Charter. In our view, and for several reasons, resorting to Charter values
as a counterweight to constitutionalized and judicially defined Charter
rights is a highly questionable practice.”123 To the extent that a case on
faith-influenced hospitals is framed as a contest between an institutional
freedom of religion right versus Charter values around equality of access
to publicly-funded care, it could be that a Court is more sympathetic to a
specific rights claim. It would be important then for challengers to argue
that there are specific Charter rights in opposition to any claimed by
faith-influenced institutions. Patients and their physicians have Charter
conscience rights for example, to determine the path of care with legally
available options. Patients have equality rights not to be discriminated
against on the basis of their own religious or conscientious beliefs that
permit MAiD.
Loyola and TWU offer important yet ambiguous guidance to provinces
as they grapple with what advice and/or direction to give faith-influenced
121. TWU, supra note 114 at para 266.
122. Ibid at para 264.
123. Ibid at para 307.
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institutions on the issue of MAiD. While it may be a fair compromise for
a professional regulatory body to allow individual physicians to offer an
effective referral (rather than compel performance) for services they object
to on a conscience or religious basis, this is an inadequate accommodation
for a hospital. Many faith-influenced institutions now take the position
that they will transfer care to secular institutions for patients needing
information about MAiD. In Ottawa, for example, the Bruyère Centre
represents the largest palliative care provider in the city.124 Its refusal to
allow MAiD to be performed on premises requires patients to leave the
institution to find new places in which to die. Patients may also deny
themselves access to crucial palliative care for fear of being trapped in
an institution that will not perform MAiD, if their situation worsens or
becomes intolerable. These are cruel choices for patients constitutionally
entitled to access this medical service. It is one thing for patients (and their
families) to adapt to a new non-objecting physician. It is another thing
entirely to have to move institutions, encounter an entirely new staff, and
possibly end up further from support systems and family members. Some
patients will find the transfer physically challenging or impossible.125
Further, given that staff at faith-influenced institutions like Bruyère
are not necessarily Catholic, or not necessarily objecting to MAiD, it is
arguably an infringement on their medical judgment and sense of ethics
and conscience to deny them the opportunity to provide a service they
may have a profound sense is appropriate and clinically warranted in
the circumstances. It is true that not all hospitals perform all procedures.
Specialized centres are common in larger cities and doctors with particular
talents may attract patients who travel for difficult procedures. MAiD is
not clinically difficult and it is not expensive.126 It is hard to conceive of a
hospital that is not clinically competent to provide MAiD. In any event, the
argument that hospitals should be allowed to specialize is one grounded
in efficiency and competence, and the same rationales do not apply to
a refusal to provide services for religious or conscientious reasons.127 It
124. Elizabeth Payne, “Ottawa’s Biggest Palliative Care Hospital says it Won’t Offer Assisted
Dying,” Ottawa Citizen (29 February 2016), online: <www.ottawacitizen.com> [https://perma.cc/
E2A9-L6KA].
125. See e.g. Tom Blackwell, “B.C. Man Faced Excruciating Transfer After Catholic Hospital
Refused Assisted Death Request,” National Post (27 September 2016), online: <www.nationalpost.
com> [https://perma.cc/DE36-V9TA]; Chris Purdy, “Patient has Assisted-Death Assessment on
Sidewalk Outside Catholic Hospital in Edmonton,” The Globe and Mail (23 October 2018), online:
<www.theglobeandmail.com> [https://perma.cc/H59Y-V7VS].
126. See Aaron J Trachtenberg & Braden Manns, “Cost Analysis of Medical Assistance in Dying
in Canada” (2017) 189:3 CMAJ E101 at E103. The authors found the cost of the medications
administered during MAiD to be as little as $25.40.
127. Shaad and Shaad, supra note 5 at 214, argue that there are legitimate non-conscience reasons
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would be a novel but interesting claim for a non-objecting physician with
privileges at a faith-influenced institution to argue a violation of section
2(a) Charter rights for an inability to follow his or her conscience in the
practice of medicine. A claimant could reasonably articulate a sincere
belief that patients should be allowed the autonomy and dignity of a death
of their own choosing. This has been argued in the United Kingdom in
scholarly writing on the impact of the Carter decision for MAiD and the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Adenitire argues that
section 9 of the ECHR (which protects freedom of conscience and religion)
might offer protection against criminal prosecution for an assisted death as,
“[i]n fact, it is entirely plausible that a doctor may provide assistance in dying
to a non-related person, not for personal gain, and out of a conscientious
conviction that assisted dying is not only morally permissible but, in some
tragic cases and when explicitly requested, morally required.”128 Since
MAiD is legal in Canada, a doctor who believes a patient to qualify, and
facing that choice from the patient, suffers a non-trivial harm to his or her
own conscience in having to deny that choice.129 A physician in a faithinfluenced institution could be entitled to protection as a conscientious
provider.
IV. Equality and freedom of religion: protecting the vulnerable
In any discussion of either individual or institutional freedom of religion
rights and MAiD, the equality rights of patients should also be considered.
The equality claims of physicians in the CPSO case were raised but not
seriously addressed in argument, and were unsuccessful at both levels
for an institution not to offer MAiD: “First, institutional non‐participation is an issue of institutional
self‐governance, not conscience. Second, there are many reasons unrelated to conscience for which a
health centre may legitimately decide to not offer a particular procedure. Institutional non‐participation
isn’t primarily, let alone exclusively, about conscience. We already recognize institutional self‐
governance in part—as when we say the government should fund, but not dictate, scientific research at
universities—but we could do so more fully by recognizing an institutional right of non‐participation
for health centres.” I have no quarrel with their second observation but maintain that in most if not all
faith-influenced institutions, MAiD is within the competence of staff. An argument that an institution
is incapable of offering MAiD is very different from arguing it is unwilling.
128. John Adenitire, “A Conscience-Based Human Right to be ‘Doctor Death’” (2016) 4 Public L 613
at 617.
129. In an example from North Bay, Ontario, a four-doctor team of MAiD providers sent a letter to
the Nippising Serenity Hospice denouncing the publically-funded hospice’s refusal to allow MAiD in
the facility. The doctors wrote “We absolutely disagree with you that MAiD ‘is not one of the tools in
the palliative care basket.’ It is in fact a tool—a very special, humane tool that thousands of Canadians
have accessed and the Canadian government, under law, has permitted….The four of us pride ourselves
on being compassionate physicians that understand, respect, and try our absolute professional and
personal best to provide compassionate end of life care to our own and other physicians’ patients in
our community.” See Chris Dawson “Local Doctors Question Hospice’s Stance on Assisted Death,”
BayToday (29 January 2020), online: <baytoday.ca> [perma.cc/TT57-6HMY].

Faith and/in Medicine: Religious and Conscientious
Objections to MAiD

691

of court.130 At the Supreme Court, section 15 did not play a significant
part in the Court’s decision in TWU, though both the Law Society and
some intervenors argued that a decision to accredit the proposed law
school would have significant ramifications for LGBTQ students. At the
Ontario Court of Appeal in TWU, Justice MacPherson made two valuable
observations on how to approach the balancing of Charter interests that
might be useful in the MAiD context. He pointed out that the Charter
analysis should take a different approach when religious freedom impacts
the equality rights of others, and he noted that a degree of interference
with religious freedom may be necessary in the public interest to promote
equality.131 The dissent at the Supreme Court of Canada was critical of
this approach and argued: “[w]hat is troubling, however, is the imposition
of judicially preferred ‘values’ to limit constitutionally protected rights,
including the right to hold other values.”132 The fact that the dissenting
judges described constitutional equality rights only as values in
juxtaposition to freedom of religion and conscience is concerning. As
argued above, the traditional approach to section 2(a) claims may need to
be rethought when the clear interests of a third-party are at stake. In the
MAiD context, the rights of the patient stand in sharp contrast to the rights
of a physician and/or institution in a freedom of conscience and religion
claim. The equality rights of patients are not just values to be sacrificed to
conscience and religious rights.
The trial judge in the Carter case found a violation of section 15 in the
criminal prohibitions on assisted death.133 Justice Lynn Smith concluded
that the Criminal Code provisions discriminated on the enumerated
section 15 ground of disability. They imposed a “more burdensome” effect
on those with physical disabilities which led to a loss of capacity, whose
only option for suicide was to refuse food and water.134 Non-disabled
people could choose less painful and stark options. She concluded:
“[the Criminal Code provision] perpetuates and worsens a disadvantage
experienced by persons with disabilities. The dignity of choice should
be afforded to Canadians equally, but the law as it stands does not do so
with respect to this ultimately personal and fundamental choice.”135 She
poignantly describes the impact of the equality violation:

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

CMDSC v CPSO, supra note 65 at paras 5, 94.
TWU v LSUC, supra note 115 at paras 100, 142.
TWU supra note 114 at para 308.
Carter v Canada, 2012 BCSC 886.
Ibid at para 1077.
Ibid at para 1161.
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The effect of the distinction is felt particularly acutely by a subset of
persons with physical disabilities…persons who are grievously and
irremediably ill and physically disabled or will soon become so, are
mentally competent, have full cognitive capacity, and wish to have a
measure of control over their circumstances at the end of their lives. They
may not wish to experience prolonged pain. They may wish to avoid the
anxiety that comes with fear that future pain will become unbearable at
a time when they are helpless. They may not wish to undergo palliative
sedation without hydration or nutrition for reasons including concern
for their families, fear for themselves or reaction against the total loss of
independence at the end of their lives.136
The Supreme Court of Canada decided the Carter case on section
7 grounds and so declined to address the equality violation as it was
unnecessary to the resolution. In the Rodriguez decision, then Chief
Justice Lamer was the only judge to consider section 15, and like Justice
Smith at trial in Carter years later, he found a violation. It is a strong
argument that there are equality issues at stake for patients denied access
to MAiD. The Supreme Court may well have to address more specifically
the section 15 equality impact of denying or limiting access to MAiD.
The consultations to expand access to new categories (e.g. where mental
illness is the sole underlying condition, mature minors, advance request
etc.) will raise new and important equality concerns.137

In considering whether to expand access to MAiD—including by
requiring effective referral models and denying institutions the right
to refuse to provide the service—the Court should be sensitive to the
material, symbolic and dignitary harms implicated by a denial of access.
The material or practical harms of a refusal to effectively refer (or of a
regulatory regime that does not require effective referral) is that a patient
is left without clear information and options-counselling and access.
Physicians who object to discussing MAiD on conscientious or religious
grounds, and who are not obligated to facilitate that discussion with a
colleague, leave a vulnerable, fragile patient, and their no doubt distraught
family, without adequate information as to the legal services available to
end suffering. A patient may well opt not to access MAiD. The patient,
fully informed, may decide on palliative options for pain management.
However, a cancer patient in treatment whose trusted oncologist will not
136. Ibid at para 1159.
137. In 2019, the Superior Court of Québec found that requirement under s 241.2(2)(d) of the
Criminal Code that an individual’s natural death has become reasonably forseeable violates s 7 of
the Charter and cannot be justified under s 1 (see Truchon, supra note 3). In response to Truchon,
the federal government introduced Bill C-7 which seeks to expand acess to MAiD by removing the
requirement that natural death has become reasonably forseeable and by allowing individuals to sign
advanced directives prioir to becoming incapable. See An Act to amend the Criminal Code (medical
assistance in dying), 1st Sess, 43rd Parl, 2020 (first reading 24 February 2020).
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facilitate information provision on MAiD, or a frail resident of a senior’s
home whose in-house physician will not engage in the conversation or
pave the way for it, leave patients with a severe material harm to their
security of the person and life.
There are also serious dignitary harms in not requiring an effective
referral protocol.138 The clear message is that there is something wrong with
the decision to die by choice. There is no doubt that a religious leader could
offer counsel and advice that in the Catholic faith, for example, suicide is
a sin. Religious leaders would certainly be free to counsel parishioners
against this choice. Physicians in Canada are secular professionals. Their
personal opinions as to what is the best option for themselves (or perhaps
their own family members who ask for familial, not professional counsel)
are irrelevant to a medical judgment. A generous view might allow that,
for an objecting physician, medical judgment as to MAiD (or abortion
or contraception) is impossible to separate from the serious religious or
conscientious view that those services are incompatible with medicine.
That is a strong justification for non-compellability. (As a practical matter,
other than in urgent circumstances, it is likely few patients would want
an objecting physician to provide the service.) The same considerations
are not as implicated in effective referral models. Yet a physician’s
judgement at a time of great vulnerability, and around decisions that even
when freely arrived at and autonomously chosen are still difficult and
profound decisions, carries great dignitary harm to the patients. For some
patients, MAiD (and abortion) are inevitable choices, borne of egregious
circumstances that few would “choose” to be in. An autonomous choice
to access the service is not the same as a celebration of the decision.
Permitting physicians not to refer to non-objecting colleagues, for the
provision of accurate and compassionate information and options, leaves
patients feeling ignorant, stigmatized and possibly ashamed. As Justice
Strathy concluded in the CPSO case, this dignatory harm raises serious
equality issues for patients, and led his Court to find that effective referral
is a minimally impairing limit on freedom of religion.

138. As NeJaime & Siegel argue, supra note 69 at 201, “Conscience-based refusals can obstruct
access to services and to information about alternative providers, and they can inflict dignitary harm,
as one citizen seeks an exemption from a legal duty to serve another on the ground that she believes
her fellow citizen is sinning. For these reasons, we believe that conscience objections by those acting
in professional roles should only be accommodated when the institution in which they are situated
mitigates the material and dignitary effects on third parties. Accommodation regimes must be designed
in such a way as to shield other citizens from the deprivations and denigrations that refusals can inflict.
In settings where there is no feasible way of organizing a regime that can accomplish this, we are
deeply skeptical of accommodation.”
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Conclusion
MAiD offers the Supreme Court and legal academics a thought-provoking
dilemma in the reconciliation of Charter rights. It is, however, so much more
than a constitutional quandary. The decision to end one’s life is arguably
the most profound decision any individual can make. The solemnity and
power of that was recognized in Carter. The Court rose to the occasion in a
decision that affirmed the core rights of the sick and dying to make choices
for themselves. These decisions may be incredibly difficult, painful, and
personal to the individual making them, and the families supporting that
person. It is not a personal decision for the infrastructure tasked with
helping the sick and dying. Institutions may be filled with people, but they
are built of bricks and mortar. The institutions themselves should not take a
moral stance on this complex social issue. They most certainly should not
take an oppositional position to the Charter-protected rights of patients.
Ideally, provincial governments across this country will appreciate their
duty to be neutral on matters of conscience and religion and take strong
leadership roles in making clear to publicly-funded institutions that they
must not deny medical services solely on religious or conscientious
grounds.139 Faith-influenced institutions have long skirted their obligations
in the reproductive context, but that void is more easily filled by clinics.
For patients who cannot receive MAiD in their own homes, institutions are
needed to deliver it.
For individual physicians, the personal and often painful task of
practicing medicine in keeping with one’s values and beliefs is more
nuanced than the institutional position. It is unfair, and perhaps impossible
to expect an individual physician to practice medicine in a way that
139. There are at least two examples where provinces intervened in favour of patient access. First, in
Antigonish, Nova Scotia, the Nova Scotia Health Authority ordered St. Martha’s Hospital to provide
MAiD on site. It was able to do so in part because it owns the facility, though St. Martha’s is operating
as a faith-influenced institution. MAiD is available at St. Martha’s in a designated space within the
institution. See: Ross Lord & Alexander Quon, “NSHA Quietly Changes Medically Assisted Dying
Policy at Catholic Hospital,” Global News (18 September 2019), online: <https://globalnews.ca/
news/5917973/nova-scotia-health-authority-st-marthas-regional-hospital-assisted-dying/> [https://
perma.cc/GCF5-Q5N8]. In Victoria, British Columbia the government took a strong stand against
a faith-influenced hospice that refused to provide MAiD: “Health Minister Adrian Dix…instructed
Fraser Health to stop paying $1.5 million annually to the Delta Hospice Society within the next
year because it is violating federal law and B.C. government policy that requires medically assisted
dying be made allowed at non-denominational facilities that receive more than half their funding
from the province.” See: Rob Shaw, “Ladner Hospice to Lose B.C. Funding for Banning Medically
Assisted Dying,” Vancouver Sun (26 February 2020), online: <https://vancouversun.com/news/localnews/ladner-hospice-loses-provincial-funding-over-refusal-to-comply-with-maid/> [https://perma.
cc/6JQN-4JGN] and see See Agnieszka Ruck, “B.C. Delta Hospice Losing Funds Over Assisted
Suicide,” the Catholic Register (27 February 2020), online: <catholicregister.org> [perma.cc/UG5QBFXL].
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profoundly negates his or her own beliefs as to care. In the context of
reproductive services like abortion or contraception, it is advisable that
physicians choose practice areas that avoid the conflict.140 MAiD presents
a more complicated set of circumstances. Many physicians, in diverse
practice areas, could be confronted with a patient who wants and is eligible
for MAiD. If we expand the criteria for access, it will be impossible for
many physicians to avoid dealing with the issue by simply choosing a lessfraught practice area. Effective referral is the best compromise to reconcile
rights. Policies like those in Ontario must prevail to protect patient rights.
The extent of complicity forced upon objecting physicians is a reasonable
way to address conflicting rights. It presents an additional burden to
patients as it forces them to consult a non-objecting physician. Still, both
sides get some relief.
It is unfortunate that MAiD may well end up back in the courts to
work out these conflicts. The Ontario Court of Appeal decision in the
CPSO case may offer some leverage in achieving stronger protections for
patients in other provinces. It is a well-reasoned and unanimous decision,
with compelling arguments as to the need for an effective referral model.
Hopefully other provincial regulatory bodies will voluntarily adopt that
model, rather than re-litigate the issue. It would be preferable for both
governments and regulatory bodies to take strong leadership roles in
advising institutions and physicians as to the proper limits of their ability
to act in a religiously-motivated way in the secular provision of health
care. Hopefully we do not need another Sue Rodriguez or Lee Carter or
Gloria Taylor, Nicole Gladu, Jean Truchon, Julia Lamb to make clear what
is at stake for those most vulnerable members of our society.

140. And at the very least, in Ontario they must make an effective referral to a non-objecting colleague.
See CMDSC v CPSO, supra note 65 and see Gilbert, supra note 66.
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